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1328 3 and roughly 15.4 million Americans are unemployed. 4 As startling as those statistics are, it is even more surprising that many American families report that it is not getting laid off from a job or having to downsize in the wake of a divorce that pushes them to brink of financial ruin; rather, it is a medical crisis. 5 Clearly, this phenomenon has not happened overnight. The American family has been struggling for years. Over the past two decades, an increasing portion of Americans have filed for bankruptcy. 6 Bankruptcy filings in federal courts have risen dramatically. 7 The total number of individual bankruptcy petitions new hurdles imposed by BAPCPA is dramatic evidence of the financial crisis that is plaguing main streets all across America. 16 At the same time, the rate of home foreclosures has skyrocketed with a record spike in foreclosures in 2008 . 17 A total of 861,664 families lost their homes to foreclosure in 2008 . 18 This means that one out of every fifty-four households received a foreclosure notice last year. The most common explanation for the rise in foreclosures has been that borrowers used interest-only loans and adjustable-rate mortgages to purchase homes that they could ill afford to buy. 19 Media pundits and analysts have also pointed their fingers at banks (for relaxing lending standards) and at aggressive practices by brokers as having contributed to the increase in nontraditional, fee-laden loans. 20 Even traditionally straight-laced lenders like Citibank and ("[P] otential borrowers were often led to high-cost and sometimes unfavorable loans that resulted in richer commissions for Countrywide's smooth-talking sales force, outsize fees to company affiliates providing services on the loans, and a roaring stock price that made Countrywide executives among the highest paid in America.").
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Household reached settlement agreements after being sued for predatory lending. 21 Thus, it is pretty clear that subprime loans and deceptive marketing practices contributed to the rise in the number of bankruptcy petitions and foreclosure filings.
However, some have argued that the banks merely preyed on a culture of overconsumption. In particular, there is a popular view that Americans, particularly those living in the middle class, are suffering from "affluenza" or the insatiable need to overconsume and live beyond their means. 22 Yet the view of the insatiable and irresponsible debtor has been debunked in recent studies. These studies have established a medical crisis, as mundane as it might seem, as being the key factor in the escalating foreclosure and bankruptcy rates. Just as important, other commentators have linked the rise in bankruptcies and foreclosures to increasing costs of medical treatments, care, and prescription drugs. 23 Research has also shown that debtors who have filed for bankruptcy and people who have lost their homes in foreclosure often report that a medical crisis contributed to their predicament. 24 Although a handful of scholars have noted that greater utilization of disability insurance might reduce the number of bankruptcies, 25 26 and proposals for how to expand access to disability insurance have thus far been inchoate. Disability insurance is an available mechanism for resolving the associated problems of injury, medical bills, and missed work, giving families just enough of a lifeline to allow them to avoid bankruptcy and foreclosure. This Article presents an argument for expanding disability insurance and demonstrates how access to disability insurance can be increased, allowing Americans to better prepare for and guard against the risk of a medical crisis.
Part II of this Article defines the scope of the problem. Part III details the prevalence of disability in the United States and how incurring a disability or illness may lead to bankruptcy. Part IV discusses the common substitutes for disability insurance for most workers, namely, health insurance, Social Security, worker's compensation programs, and retirement plans. As will be discussed, these sources of disability coverage for workers fail to replace income at adequate levels, exclude too many participants from coverage, and impose lengthy waiting periods, along with several other problems. Part V presents data supporting the theory that state-mandated disability insurance offers an effective solution to the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. Part VI presents a blueprint for designing effective state-mandated insurance schemes. Finally, Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY IMBROGLIO
The majority of the research regarding the link between a medical crisis and bankruptcy has been pioneered by Elizabeth Warren and other scholars working on the Consumer Bankruptcy Project. 27 The scholars of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project III bankruptcy and forms of social insurance including unemployment insurance, Medicare, disability insurance, and workers' compensation); Jacoby, supra note 5, at 481 ("Because medical problems also can reduce one's ability to work, high-income households also should consider purchasing disability insurance coverage, which is expensive but within reach for this segment of the population."); Warren, supra note 6, at 38 ("Our federal disability system is geared toward those who will be out of work for a year or more. Families facing cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and many other diseases that may leave them with periods of debilitation but who may recover are left out of the system entirely. Whether change is to be accomplished by public or private means, the expansion of disability insurance to aid all workers who are struck with a serious disease should be on national agenda." conducted a national study in order to better understand why debtors file for bankruptcy. The researchers surveyed a random sample of 2314 debtors during early 2007 and examined their bankruptcy court records. In addition, they conducted extensive telephone interviews with 1032 of these bankruptcy filers. 28 Their study was one of the first to illuminate the connection between a medical crisis and bankruptcy.
According to the findings of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, medical problems contributed to nearly two-thirds (sixty-two percent) of all bankruptcies in 2007. 29 Between 2001 and 2007, the proportion of all bankruptcies attributable to medical problems rose by forty-nine percent. 30 Particularly alarming was the finding that most of the debtors bankrupted by medical problems had health insurance. More than two-thirds were insured at the start of the bankrupting illness, including sixty percent who had private insurance coverage. 31 The debtors with private insurance reported medical bills that averaged $17,749, versus $26,971 for the uninsured. 32 Those debtors who initially had health insurance but lost coverage during the course of their illness had costs averaging $22,568. 33 Most of the medically bankrupt were solidly middle-class before their medical crisis-half were homeowners and three-fifths had attended or graduated from college. 34 Over the past two decades the number of families declaring bankruptcy after a serious illness has multiplied more than 2000%. 35 While some debtors lost their health insurance because they were unable to afford the premiums, some maintained their health insurance coverage throughout the medical crisis yet still could not afford to pay their medical bills. 37 In either scenario, the result is the same: the family ends up in bankruptcy court. 38 An illness or accident leads to missing work, followed by missed wages, job loss, and financial collapse.
The findings of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project were similar to the results obtained by Robertson, Egelhof, and Hoke (the "Robertson Study"). The principal investigators in the Robertson Study sought to understand the causes of home foreclosure by conducting a survey of homeowners on the brink of foreclosure who had (allegedly) defaulted on their loans and had their lenders initiate foreclosure proceedings against them.
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In the Robertson Study, nearly half of the respondents (49%) indicated that medical problems in part caused their foreclosure.
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The investigators also examined objective indicia of medical disruptions in the two years prior to foreclosure, "including those respondents paying more than $2000 of medical bills out of pocket (37%), those losing two or more weeks of work because of injury or Ultimately, about seven in ten of the "respondents either selfreported a medical cause of foreclosure" or experienced one of the above indicia of medical disruptions in the two years before foreclosure. 42 "In many cases, homeowners were hit with a perfect storm of factors-a few thousand dollars of medical bills, a few weeks of missed work . . . [and a] rising interest rate-all combined to push them over the edge into foreclosure." 43 In order to weather the perfect storm, or even a mild one, individuals and families need personal savings and social safety nets. Thirty years ago, the average family saved about 11 % of their take home pay. In contrast, during the housing boom, some experts claimed that the average savings rate had dropped to negative one percent due in large part to Americans tapping their home equity and other easy lines of credit. 44 In May 2009, the Commerce Department reported that the rate of personal savings as a percentage of disposable income for that month had increased to 6.9%, the highest levels since 1993, 45 but by August 2009, the rate had dropped to 3.0%. 46 The sharp momentary spike in the personal savings rate in early 2009 suggests that Americans were trying to use stimulus money to build a buffer against the threat of job losses during the recession. However, most were unable to maintain such a high rate of savings because so many Americans were living paycheck to paycheck. Thus, most Americans simply are not able to maintain a personal rate of savings that would allow them to survive a loss of income caused by a medical crisis. With little or no savings, families simply do not have a "rainy day" fund to weather multiple setbacks. For example, a family that is pushed to the brink by an adjustable-rate mortgage often has no extra money to cover expenses when wages are lost due to an unexpected illness. Without adequate savings, most families faced with a medical crisis dangle on the precipice of bankruptcy.
Further, having health insurance is not enough to insulate families from facing financial ruin. In many cases, high out-of-pocket maximum expenditures and high deductibles result in families having to shoulder a large portion of the costs of medical treatments. 48 Even worse, in many cases individuals covered under such high deductible or catastrophic plans will delay going to the doctor for routine medical care and not seek care for seemingly minor ailments, which when left untreated all too often become harder and more costly to cure, ultimately requiring more missed days to remedy. 49 For this reason, many families that have health insurance are still not prepared to shoulder the costs that their health insurance fails to cover. 50 Moreover, health insurance is designed simply to replace lost wages and income when workers suffer from an extended illness. , at B6 (noting that low caps on lifetime coverage and high out-ofpocket costs for doctor visits are hidden costs that might make these plans undesirable for many workers).
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In contrast, disability insurance is specifically designed to provide wage replacement when income is lost due to an accident or illness. Thus, individuals and families who are covered by disability insurance receive a certain level 51 of wage replacement to compensate for the wages lost due to an unexpected illness. Having wage replacement will likely enable most families to avoid or at least significantly delay becoming a foreclosure and bankruptcy statistic. Unfortunately, most Americans do not purchase disability insurance. Americans buy life insurance to provide for their families after death, but they rarely buy insurance to protect their families in the event that they lose their ability to work. 52 Given the likelihood of disability, it is essential that more families have access to disability insurance in order to ensure financial stability during a medical crisis.
III. THE DISABILITY IMBROGLIO
Mention the word "disability" and people will likely conjure up images of persons who have congenital or developmental disabilities such as cerebral palsy, mental retardation, or Down syndrome. Disability can mean different things in different contexts, but this Article focuses on a concept of disability that includes a physical or mental impairment caused by an illness or accident that impedes an individual from working in her normal capacity. As shall be discussed, such disabilities occur rather frequently and are often linked to consumer bankruptcy filings and foreclosures.
In the United States, a disabling injury occurs every second. This amounts to sixty disabling injuries per minute and over 85,000 each day. Surprisingly, more than 90% of the disabilities in the U.S. are not work-related and hence not covered under worker's compensation benefits.
53 Almost forty-two million Americans are disabled. 54 Sixteen percent of the female population is disabled and 55 About one-fourth of Americans entering the work force today will become disabled before they retire. 56 Most disabilities are attributed to pregnancy 57 or illness. The leading causes of illness include cancer, heart disease, and diabetes.
58 Back injuries and accidents also are common causes of disability. 59 Thus, a period of disability can be caused by a myriad of reasons. For instance, the woman next door, who is battling breast cancer, 60 will be disabled when she is unable to work while undergoing chemotherapy and radiation treatments. Mounting medical bills and missed wages from mounting absences from work for medical treatments could easily wipe out her savings (if she was lucky enough to even have savings), and she could be teetering on financial ruin regardless of whether or not she is covered by health insurance. 61 Similarly, the young associate at a law firm who is injured in a serious car accident will be disabled during her recovery period. Finally, the middle-aged man who decides to reduce the stress in his life by enrolling in a yoga class and strains his back will be disabled for the several weeks that he is out of the office recovering from his back injury. All three would easily face severe financial strain without disability insurance to replace the income lost while recuperating.
In spite of the relatively high chances of becoming disabled during one's lifetime, 62 62. Although most Americans lack disability insurance, over two-thirds of all families in the U.S. own some kind of life insurance. In 2008, total life insurance coverage in the U.S.
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private sector, lack disability insurance. 63 Without disability insurance and without personal savings, Americans have few options for avoiding bankruptcy and foreclosure in the wake of income disruptions and medical illness. As mentioned previously, the majority of Americans are living from paycheck to paycheck 64 with little or no savings. 65 This means that even with health insurance many are unable to handle their share of the medical costs due to a lack of savings and the high out-of-pocket medical costs that are associated with many insurance plans. 66 Consequently, very little stands between the average worker and financial ruin when a medical crisis happens.
The data collected from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, discussed previously in Part II, shows an alarming increase in the number of consumer bankruptcy petitions and home foreclosures. In 2008, bankruptcies were up 31% 67 and foreclosures were up 81% from the previous year. 68 Interviews with debtors, reviews of bankruptcy petitions, and interviews with individuals whose homes are in the foreclosure process all paint a similar picture. The studies taken as a whole illustrate that average working Americans quickly deplete what little savings they have when a medical crisis occurs. Soon the combination of medical bills and lost wages pushes families into bankruptcy court and out of their homes.
Having disability insurance as a safety net would go a long way toward helping workers weather a medical crisis. For instance, the leading cause of long-term disability is cancer. 69 and increased access to health care have led to a decline in the incidence and mortality rates associated with the lung, prostate, breast, and colorectal cancers, the four most common types of cancer. 70 The National Cancer Institute estimates that approximately 11.1 million Americans with a cancer diagnosis were alive in 2005, and the five-year survival rate for all cancers diagnosed between 1996 and 2004 was 66%, up from 50% during the 1975 to 1977 period. 71 Despite the fact that survival rates are increasing, the numbers of people diagnosed with cancer each year still remains high.
Roughly 1.5 million workers will be diagnosed with cancer this year.
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Many of these 1.5 million workers will undergo chemotherapy or radiation treatments. Some will face temporary disability and others will have a long-term disability. Most of these 1.5 million workers will not meet the Social Security Disability Income definition of "disabled" because they will not meet the requirement that either the period of disability last 12 months or be likely to result in death. 73 In addition, most of these 1.5 million workers will not qualify for worker's compensation because their cancer will not be caused by workplace exposure to a cancer-causing agent, such as asbestos. Retirement benefits will also likely be unavailable to these 1.5 million workers diagnosed with cancer because they will not meet the definition of "totally disabled" as defined by many retirement plans. 74 will take time off from work to recover from an illness without adequate disability coverage.
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Whether faced with cancer, bed-rest during pregnancy, weeks of recovery from heart surgery, or one of the multitude of other disabilities, most workers will find that they have few resources available to replace the income lost during their recovery period when they are unable to work. Thus, disability insurance is needed to bridge the income gap created by lost wages during a medical crisis. Disability insurance pays a percentage of lost wages when a worker cannot work due to an illness or injury. Often the benefits provided by a disability plan can be the difference between making ends meet during a medical crisis and falling behind on mortgage notes and car payments.
In general, there are two categories of disability insurance available to workers: short-term disability insurance and long-term disability insurance. Short-term disability insurance is designed to provide workers with income replacement if they become disabled for a short duration, usually a year or less. 77 Typically, short-term disability policies provide a worker with a portion of her predisability wages, most commonly one-half to two-thirds of her predisability income for a period of thirteen, twenty-six, or fifty-two weeks.
78 Short-term disability claims are most often filed due to pregnancy and non-back-related injuries.
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In contrast, long-term disability insurance is designed to provide benefits to workers when the period of disability is expected to last for a long period of time-usually a year or more. 80 Benefits under a long-term disability insurance plan typically begin at the expiration of short-term benefits. Like short-term disability policies, long-term individuals returning to work, and many of those trying to return to work face a myriad of difficulties. Because of the increased demand from clients seeking to return to the workforce, some advocates began publishing guides to help with the transition. policies typically replace anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of the worker's lost wages. 81 The most common long-term disability claims stem from cancer, pregnancy complications, back injuries, heart disease, and diabetes. 82 Thus, short-term and long-term disability insurance are designed to provide a portion of the income lost when workers are forced to miss work due to an injury or sickness. The disability benefits received under a short-term or long-term disability policy can be used to pay the mortgage, health insurance premiums, food costs, and other basic necessities. Without disability insurance, most Americans have few alternative means of covering the cost of basic needs when faced with an unexpected injury or illness. Missed work equals missed wages; missed wages equal missed payments on homes, cars, and medical bills, and soon, bankruptcy. Most workers are not insured against these categories of worries.
Unfortunately, most Americans lack adequate disability insurance. 83 This is in large part because they do not have access to moderately priced disability insurance. Individual disability policies are often hard to find and even harder to qualify for. 84 In addition, individual policies are notoriously expensive. 85 A recent survey by the Department of Labor found that in 2009 roughly 37% of workers had access to group short-term disability insurance through their employer. 88 Of the workers with access, 97% of them enrolled in the short-term disability plan.
89 Nationwide about 36% of workers have coverage under a group short-term disability insurance plan. 90 Not surprisingly, white-collar workers are the most likely to have access to short-term disability insurance through their employer. Around 43% of white-collar workers have employer-provided access to short-term disability benefits. 91 In contrast, service workers have the least access. Only about 23% of service workers have employers who offer a short-term disability insurance plan. 92 Similarly, about 33% of workers have access to a group long-term disability insurance plan through their employer, and about 32% of all private sector workers are covered by a group long-term disability insurance plan. 93 About 96% of workers elected long-term disability insurance when a group rate was offered through their employer. Fifty percent of white-collar workers have long-term disability insurance coverage, while only 15% of service workers have coverage. 94 Overall, the data clearly shows that employees participate in very high numbers when offered group disability insurance by their employer. As a result, increasing the percentage of employers who offer group disability insurance should greatly increase the When group disability insurance is offered, the employee typically has the option of electing short-term disability insurance, long-term disability insurance, or both. As with most group programs, the cost of group disability insurance is usually less than that of similar individual disability insurance programs. The average premium for a group short-term disability policy was $202 per year in 2008. 95 When a short-term disability policy is purchased through an employer, the policy is "guaranteed issue"-meaning a subscriber does not have to take a medical exam to prove insurability. If a worker's employer does not offer short-term disability coverage, individual policies are only available on an extremely limited basis.
Similarly, the average cost for long-term disability coverage under a group plan is roughly $225 a year. 96 Unlike the short-term disability market, an individual long-term disability policy is widely available, albeit at a significant cost. An individual long-term disability policy purchased directly from an insurer costs well over $1000 each year on average. 97 This price difference is substantial to the average worker. For example, a forty-year-old male professional who makes $50,000 a year would pay about $1,700 a year for a policy that would pay him $2,900 a month for up to five years for a covered disability. 98 In contrast, if the forty-year-old professional were covered under a group plan offered through his employer, then he could enjoy similar coverage for about $225 a year. 99 Thus, the lack of access to moderately priced disability insurance means that most Americans do not purchase disability insurance and are left without a needed safety net when they are unable to work due to an illness or injury.
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The failure of employers to readily offer disability insurance is in part based on the lack of aggressive marketing by insurers. Kenneth Abraham and Lance Liebman have articulated two theories for why insurers have allowed the private disability market to remain 101 First, the threat of adverse selection limits interest from insurers in increasing their disability insurance offerings. Adverse selection generally refers to the disproportionate tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses. Thus, most applicants seeking disability coverage seek out the coverage because of a belief that they have some risk factors that increases their need for coverage. This phenomenon raises costs for the insurers and policyholders alike. Thus, those who do not fully appreciate the probability of a disabling injury will likely be deterred from buying coverage because of the higher prices and lack of appreciation for the true scope of the risk. 102 Second, "moral hazard" ratchets up the cost of individual disability insurance policies and limits their supply. Moral hazard is the tendency of an insured party to exercise less care to minimize losses than she would exercise if she were uninsured. 103 Moral hazard is present both ex ante and ex post in the disability context. One who has disability insurance is more likely to become disabled than an uninsured person and is more likely to have a slower recovery or to never recover. 104 Insurers try to induce policyholders to recovery quickly by limiting coverage to typically no more than 60% of aftertax income and by reducing benefits by the amounts recovered from Social Security and workers' compensation programs. 102. See id. at 102 n.82. Although all voluntary insurance is affected to some extent by adverse selection, the disability insurance market is especially vulnerable to adverse selection because the application screening process that is typically used to neutralize this problem in other insurance contexts tends to be least effective in the disability insurance context. There is a lack of reliable data to base predictions on. For instance, morbidity data is not as widely available as mortality data, nor is it as reliable. Additionally, whether an injury or sickness will disable an individual is dependent, in large part, on personality traits which are hard to reduce to objective indices. readily have access to moderately priced disability insurance. As a result, the majority of American workers rely on inadequate substitutes for disability insurance. A minority of workers, however, are covered by state-mandated disability insurance. As will be discussed in Part V, states that have mandated short-term insurance generally have a lower per-capita consumer bankruptcy rate than the national average.
IV. SUBSTITUTES FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE
Because most workers are not covered by state-mandated disability insurance, most workers are not covered by any disability insurance policy and rely on ineffective substitutes for disability insurance. This Part discusses alternatives to disability insurance that are commonly thought to provide some protection against a disability. Although these substitutes can ameliorate the effects of a medical crisis, they are not adequate substitutes for disability insurance.
A. Comprehensive Health Care: An Inadequate Solution
From the bankruptcy courts to Congress and everywhere in between, there is no shortage of evidence showing that health care costs are crippling families in America. Thus, many interested parties and pundits alike have advocated for some level of health care reform as the cure to the medical bankruptcy imbroglio.
Growth in national health expenditures (NHE) in the United States was projected to be 6.1% in 2008. The average annual NHE growth is expected to be 6.2% per year for 2008 through 2018. By 2018, national health spending is expected to reach $4.4 trillion and comprise just over one-fifth (20.3%) of the gross domestic product (GDP). 106 In 2009, national health spending was $2.5 trillion.
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Health care costs also comprise a larger part of family budgets. As a result, workers are increasingly unable to afford comprehensive health insurance. The average cost of an employer-subsidized health insurance policy for a family of four increased by 131% between 106. CTRS. FOR 
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One of the earliest, most organized campaigns for compulsory health insurance in the United States was started by the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL). The AALL was an organization of economists, lawyers, and other reformers who studied labor legislation and pushed reforms in the early part of the twentieth century. 112 The organization was triumphant in passing workers' compensation legislation. Germany had inaugurated the first national system of compulsory health insurance in 1883, followed closely by Norway in 1909 and Britain in 1911. In turn, momentum seemed to be swelling for compulsory health care in America. 113 Buoyed by its workers' compensation victory, the AALL decided to expand its agenda to include health care coverage for lowincome workers. It produced a model health insurance bill in 1915 and initially garnered the support of the American Medical In a nutshell, the bill limited coverage to workers earning less than $1,200 a year. The services of physicians, nurses, and hospitals were included, as was sick pay, maternity benefits, and a death benefit of fifty dollars to pay for funeral expenses. Costs were to be shared between workers, employers, and the state.
The AALL's push ultimately ended in failure. In the end, special interest groups and a changing political climate led to the defeat of the bill. The American Medical Association, unions, and commercial insurance companies all lobbied against the bill because a disagreement had arisen over physician payments within the American Medical Association; the unions feared that if the government provided health insurance, the unions' power might wane, and the commercial insurance industry feared lost profits. 115 Moreover, the political climate changed dramatically when America entered World War I in 1917. Nationalism and anticommunist rhetoric, along with the typical priority shifts during wartime, led to the first defeat of compulsory health care. If the AALL's vision of comprehensive health care had passed, consumer bankruptcies arising from medical illness or injury would likely not be a problem today.
With the defeat of the AALL's bill, later attempts at health care focused more narrowly on benefits for the cost of receiving health care services. Thus, no health reform proposals since the AALL's proposal have included a wage replacement component for disabled workers. 117 First Lady Hillary Clinton led the taskforce charged with drafting the bill. The fruit of her efforts was a very complex, nearly 1400-page bill known as the Health Security Act. 118 Clinton's attempt, like others in the past, failed. The complexity of the bill coupled with the secrecy surrounding its drafting played a role in its defeat. Although quite lengthy, the bill did not provide benefits comprehensively. It did not mandate paid sick, maternity, or paternity leave for workers, nor did it provide an additional death benefit.
Special Interest Groups again played a large role in swaying public opinion against the bill.
119 The Health Insurance Association of America sponsored the infamous "Harry and Louise" ad campaign, which portrayed an ordinary couple complaining about the government limiting their individual choices.
120 Though many believe the ad did not affect public opinion, the ad is often credited with helping to deflate public support for the Clinton plan by portraying the plan as a threat to the public. 121 An additional impediment to passage of the Clinton bill was that the Democrats were not able to agree on its contents, and Republicans were able to successfully mount opposition and galvanize the public.
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In spite of past failures, in 2009, newly elected President Obama decided to press forward with making health care reform a top legislative priority. Having large Democratic majorities in the both the House and Senate seemed to present reformers with the perfect opportunity to actually pass sweeping legislation. Finally, after a century of false starts, it seemed all but certain that a health care reform bill, which would provide health insurance for most 117 124 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "PPACA") requires that all U.S. citizens and legal residents have qualifying health coverage. Those without coverage pay a tax penalty not to exceed 2.5% of household income. 125 In the legislative history of the PPACA, Congress specifically noted how the cost of health care impacts commerce and the national economy. In particular, Congress noted the fact that "62% of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses" and argued that "[b]y significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of th[e] Act, will improve financial security for families." 126 Thus, one of the thrusts of the PPACA is to make health insurance more affordable for families so that the costs of medical care will not cause families undue hardship and financial ruin. To that end, various subsidies make health insurance affordable for lowto moderate-income families. 127 In addition, the PPACA reduces the out-of-pocket limits for those with incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty line. 128 Finally, insurers are required to provide 126. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(G). 127. The PPACA provides premium credits such that the premium contributions are limited to the following percentages of income for specified income levels: For families earning up to 133% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), contributions are limited to no more than 2% of income; for families earning between 133% and 150% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 4% of income; for families earning between 150% and 200% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 6.3% of income; for families earning between 200% and 250% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 8.05% of income; and for families earning between 250 and 400% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 9.5% of income. In spite of its noble efforts, the PPACA is unlikely to stem the tide of medical bankruptcies for three main reasons. First, the out-ofpocket maximums are still too high for working Americans. The current recession is, in part, a product of high debt loads and the dismal rate of savings among American families.
130 Therefore, with little to no money left after paying regular monthly household bills, many families are sure to encounter hardship even with an out-ofpocket maximum as low as $2500. To assume that the average family earning roughly $40,000 can afford up to $6000 in out-of-pocket costs, as contemplated by the PPACA, is totally unrealistic.
Second, the loss of income that accompanies a health crisis leaves families with medical bills and no income to pay those bills. The study by the Consumer Bankruptcy Project illustrated that most of the medically bankrupt had health insurance but still faced crippling out-of-pocket costs. Many of those families were ruined by out-ofpocket costs below the caps in the PPACA. 131 Five to ten thousand dollars in medical costs coupled with lost wages in a given year is still more than enough to drive many families into bankruptcy. The data shows that it is the combination of additional medical bills and the loss of wages that pushes families into bankruptcy. Seven out of ten debtors interviewed by the Consumer Bankruptcy Project reported that income loss due to health problems contributed "very much" to their bankruptcies. 132 Therefore, attempts to reduce the costs of medical care are an incomplete solution to reducing consumer bankruptcies.
Finally, the fate of PPACA is still uncertain. A litany of states have pursued filings challenging the constitutionality of the PPACA. Currently, five judges have weighed in on the constitutionality of the PPACA, with two judges finding the legislation to be unconstitutional. 133 For the reasons discussed in this Part, it is unlikely that the PPACA or any remedy based entirely on expanding access to affordable health insurance will stem the tide of medical bankruptcies. The data illustrates that families file for bankruptcy because of missed wages and medical costs. 135 Therefore, any solution must provide wage replacement during a health crisis when the worker is unable to work. Thus, the expansion of disability insurance is a necessary element of any effective solution. When trying to recover from an injury or sickness without disability insurance, families simply cannot pay medical bills, mortgage payments, and car notes when they lack savings and can no longer rely on their weekly paycheck.
In addition, presenting the case to the American public regarding the necessity of disability insurance should be much easier than creating the buy-in that is necessary for a sweeping overhaul of health care financing. Many ardent supporters of the PPACA emphasized that roughly forty-seven million Americans, equaling 18% of the population under the age of sixty-five, lack health insurance. 136 Thus, supporters assumed that it would be axiomatic that, with 18% of Americans lacking health insurance, there would be a large groundswell of popular support. However, supporters overlooked the fact that over 200 million Americans had health insurance, and that many Americans were relatively content with insurance mandate exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and that because the mandate was so inextricable linked to the entire act that the whole act was unconstitutional); Liberty Univ. v. 
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their private plans and fearful of any changes to their plans and increased governmental regulation. Most Americans lack disability insurance, 137 in contrast to health insurance. Therefore, any effort to increase access to disability insurance would be giving most Americans something they lack rather than taking away or altering something they have and are comfortable with.
B. Social Security Benefits: An Inadequate Solution
Social Security was expanded in 1956 to provide disability insurance for American workers with long-term disabilities. Today, most American workers who have long-term disability coverage have it through the federal Social Security Disability program. 138 In July 2011, 8,435,000 disabled workers received disability under the Social Security program. Those receiving benefits had an average monthly benefit of $1,069.90 (average spousal and children's benefits amounts were $288.10 and $317.50, respectively).
139 After twenty-four months, individuals who receive disability benefits under Social Security are also eligible for Medicare Part A, which covers hospital costs and a few other medical expenses, and Medicare Part B, which covers doctor bills and other medically necessary and preventive subjects.
140 They are also eligible to participate in the prescription drug benefit under Medicare Part D. 141 Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, Social Security's disability income does not provide an adequate safety net for many workers. As Warren has noted, "the holes in the SSDI safety net are large enough to drive a truck through-or for millions of families to fall through."
142 This is because the definition of disability is extremely stringent. Although any individual who is covered under Social Security and suffers a disabling sickness or injury can apply for a monthly benefit, the covered individual must not be able to work in any occupation (not just her own occupation) because of a medically determined physical or mental impairment that is expected to last at least twelve months or result in death. 143 Under this standard, for instance, the neighbor undergoing chemotherapy and radiation therapy in her quest to beat breast cancer, the young associate at the large law firm who was injured in a car accident, and the middle-aged man who injures his back while attempting a yoga pose would all fail to meet the requisite definition of disability. Because the standard of disability is so exacting, it is not surprising that about one-eighth of participants die before completing the twoyear waiting period.
144 Therefore, the disability program under Social Security fails to provide easy access to income replacement for middle class families and individuals who are confronted with financial hardships as a result of a sudden illness or disability.
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C. Workers' Compensation: An Inadequate Solution
Every state has a workers' compensation program that covers most workers. 146 To be eligible for benefits under a workers' compensation program, the disability must arise from accidents in the workplace or in performance of normal services. Workers' compensation programs are funded by an employer's purchase of qualified insurance or by specifically and tightly defined selfinsurance programs.
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In addition to disability income, workers receiving workers' compensation benefits usually receive medical care and rehabilitation benefits.
148 Benefits are usually determined as a percentage-typically about 70% of the worker's wage. However, like disability income provided under the Social Security program, there is usually a 1356 maximum weekly benefit amount that caps the benefits at a relatively low rate. In addition, benefits are sometimes determined by the degree of the worker's disability, meaning that a worker might only qualify for payment for a partial disability.
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Although workers' compensation programs provide needed wage replacement for workers who are injured on the job, it is important to note that workers suffering from a non-work related injury or sickness are not eligible to receive benefits under workers' compensation programs. As the economy has shifted from a manufacturing-based economy to one driven by the provision of information, innovation, finance, and services, the working environments for many workers have shifted from factories fraught with danger to relatively safe air-conditioned office buildings. 150 Currently, workplace injuries and illnesses represent a small fraction of the new cases of disability each year in the United States. In fact, almost 90% of the disabilities occurring each year in the U.S. are not work-related. 151 Since most of the families and individuals teetering on the brink of financial disaster are grappling with medical crises that are not job-related, workers' compensation benefits are not available as an additional source of income. Therefore, workers' compensation programs are not a viable source of wage replacement for most American workers.
D. Retirement Plans: An Inadequate Solution
Another potential source of disability benefits is an employersponsored retirement plan, such as a pension, or a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan qualified under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. The primary purpose of a qualified retirement plan is to provide retirement benefits when a participant leaves the workforce, which may occur earlier than the normal retirement date if the participant is determined to be disabled. Disability benefits are provided as a secondary benefit of some retirement plans. The standard for disability under retirement plans varies widely. While most plans require a standard of an absolute and permanent disability, others may permit disability payments for a temporary disability. Disability payments received from a retirement plan by the disabled participant are generally fully taxable. 152 However, there may be some tax-free benefits paid if the payments are deemed to be funded by the employee's own nondeductible contributions to the retirement plan.
153
From an employer's perspective, retirement plans are attractive vehicles for meeting disability needs because the employer can take a current business expense deduction for its contributions to the plan and the employees are not currently taxed on these contributions. Instead, just like in the typical retirement context, employees are taxed only as benefits are disbursed from the plan. 154 In all cases, the amount of any disability payment is dictated by the size of the retirement account or fund accrued for the benefit of the participant. Thus, the amount of the disability benefit usually correlates with the length of time that the disabled worker has participated in the plan. The amount of benefit increases with the length of participation.
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Relying on a retirement plan to replace income lost in the wake of a disability can have severe consequences later in life. When faced with mounting medical bills, missed mortgage payments, and other crucial bills, withdrawing money from a retirement plan to replace lost income due to a disability might seem like a good idea; however, using retirement savings early comes at a tremendous cost. Namely, the individual has depleted some or all of her retirement nest egg. Depending on her age and length of the disability, she might not have enough healthy working years left to replenish her retirement 152. See IRS, PUBLICATION 525: TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME, at 17 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ irs-pdf/p525.pdf ("If you retired on disability, you must include in income any disability pension you receive under a plan that is paid for by your employer. You must report your taxable disability payments as wages on line 7 of Form 1040 or Form 1040A until you reach minimum retirement age.").
153. 1358 account. Thus, siphoning off retirement income to pay her bills during a period of disability leaves her without a necessary retirement nest egg. In sum, retirement plans were designed to provide income for workers during retirement and not during a period of disability. At every phase of a worker's career, withdrawing money from her retirement account to cope with a disability is fraught with peril, and in most cases will only delay a bankruptcy filing until the retirement years.
V. A SOLUTION TO THE MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY AND DISABILITY IMBROGLIOS
As discussed previously in Part IV, health insurance, Social Security, workers' compensation, and retirement plans are inadequate substitutes for disability insurance. Providing workers with disability insurance is a necessary component of curing the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. In accounting for the wide variety in the number of bankruptcy filings across the states, researchers and scholars have overlooked the impact of mandated disability insurance.
Recently, Lefgren and McIntrye attempted to account for the puzzling disparity in the rate of bankruptcy filings across the states.
156
The findings from their study suggest that the differing number of bankruptcy filings across states reflects, in large part, the relative costs of formal and informal default and legal institutions that exist in the states. 157 The study also finds that the size of the public safety net and legality of payday lending were statistically and economically insignificant. 158 The presence of mandated short-term disability coverage was not included in the public safety nets analyzed by Lefgren and McIntyre.
As discussed previously, the purpose of disability insurance is to provide a basic level of wage replacement when a worker is unable to work due to illness or injury. Thus, it is understandable why having disability insurance would lessen the impact of an injury or illness and make it less likely that the individual would file for bankruptcy as 156 163 are the only states that require employers to provide short-term disability benefits for their employees. These states require private employers to provide a minimum amount of shortterm disability benefits to all employees while disabled. States that have compulsory short-term disability plans for private sector employees are generally below the national average for bankruptcy filings. When comparing the average number of per capita bankruptcy filings in states with compulsory short-term disability insurance to the national per capita average, the average rate for the group of five states with compulsory short-term disability insurance was lower than the national average, as evidenced in the chart below. Although more advanced statistical analysis comparing bankruptcy filings in states with compulsory short-term disability insurance to those without compulsory disability insurance is warranted, these findings provide support for the idea that providing workers with compulsory short-term disability insurance coverage helps reduce the likelihood that a wage interruption due to a nonwork-related illness or accident will lead to bankruptcy.
Thus, increasing worker access through state-mandated disability insurance seems to be an effective solution to combating the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. As a first step toward implementation of this solution, state legislators must be educated about the basics of how these insurance programs are administered and their positive impact on workers. This Part describes the state-mandated insurance programs in detail and proposes increasing the number of states mandating shortterm disability coverage for all workers. As noted in the previous Part, only five states mandate short-term disability insurance in addition to workers' compensation insurance for their workers. 166 The average per capita bankruptcy rate for states that have compulsory short-term disability coverage is below the national average. Although further statistical analysis is necessary, this suggests that expanding mandatory short-term disability insurance coverage to more states would help decrease the number of bankruptcies.
A. Existing State-Mandated Disability Insurance Programs: A Better Solution
Funding
There are two funding models for state-mandated disability insurance programs. States have elected to fund their insurance programs by (1) requiring employees to fund the plan through a payroll deduction; or (2) giving employers the option of paying a certain percentage of wages into the program or cost sharing with employees. California and Rhode Island fund their programs exclusively through employee payroll deductions. Workers in California were taxed on income up to $90,669.00 in 2009 and up to $93,316.00 in 2010. 167 The maximum employee contribution rate for California workers in 2010 was $1,026.48 (which is 1.1% of $93,316.00). Similarly, in Rhode Island, employees pay 1.3% of the first $58,400 of income to cover the cost of disability insurance in Rhode Island. 
1362
In contrast, in Hawaii, the employer has the option of paying the entire cost of the disability insurance or sharing the cost with its employees. 169 If the employer opts to share the costs with employees, then the employer may deduct one-half of the premium cost but not more than 0.5% of the employees' weekly wages up to the maximum of $4.39 per week for 2009. 170 Similarly, in New York, employers may pay for coverage for their employees or share the cost with their employees. 171 New York provides that an employer is allowed, but not required, to collect contributions from its employees to offset the cost of providing benefits. An employee's contribution is computed at the rate of one-half of one percent of her wages, but may not be more than sixty cents per week. 172 Finally, in New Jersey both employers and employees are required to contribute to the disability insurance fund. In 2011, the employee contribution rate is one-half of one percent on the first $29,600 of wages paid by an employer in a calendar year. Although the rates vary, employers must also pay contributions on the first $29,600 in wages paid to each worker. 
Benefits
Although disability is defined slightly differently by each state, generally, benefits are payable for any disability which results from any non-job related mental or physical illness or injury that prevents the employee from performing her regular or customary work.
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Illness or injury also includes pregnancy complications, childbirth, or 169 . In addition, an employer may provide TDI benefits by adopting one of the following methods: (a) by purchasing insurance from an authorized insurance carrier, (b)by adopting a sick leave policy, which is in essence a self-insured plan, that must be approved by the state, or (c) by a collective bargaining agreement that contains sick leave benefits at least as favorable as required by the TDI. HAW. REV. STAT. § § 392-1 to -101 (2009 176. New Jersey provides for paid family leave but requires certification. b. Any period of family temporary disability leave for the serious health condition of a family member of the covered individual shall be supported by certification provided by a health care provider. The certification shall be sufficient if it states:
(1) The date, if known, on which the serious health condition commenced;
(2) The probable duration of the condition; . 18 2011) . The benefit amount under this program is calculated by looking at a worker's wages during a specific twelve-month period of time. The twelve-month base period begins roughly seventeen months before the worker becomes disabled and ends about five months before the disability begins. The twelve-month base period is divided into four quarters, and the quarter when the worker had the highest earnings is the quarter used to determine the benefit amount. 1364 receive the maximum benefit amount an individual must have earned at least $23,305.46 in a calendar quarter during the base period.
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There is also a waiting period of seven days before benefits are payable.
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Hawaii's disability insurance provides cash benefits of 58% of the disabled employee's average weekly wages. 181 The maximum weekly benefit for 2009 is $510.
182 Workers are eligible for benefits from the eighth day of disability, and there is a seven-consecutive-day waiting period. 183 Benefits are limited to a maximum of twenty-six weeks of benefit payments during a benefit year. 184 Similarly, under New York's insurance program, 185 the benefit rate is 50% of the employee's last eight weeks of average gross wages with a maximum benefit of $170 per week.
186 A worker must be off work eight consecutive days to be eligible for benefits. The first week (seven days) is a waiting week that is not paid. 187 The maximum benefit period is twenty-six weeks in a fifty-two-week period.
188 Thus, the benefits available under New York's system are by far the least generous.
In New Jersey, an eligible employee is paid two-thirds of her average weekly wage up to the maximum amount payable, which is $546 as of January 1, 2009. 189 The average weekly disability benefit is generally based on the employee's earnings in the eight calendar 179 . Id. 180. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2627. 181. In order to qualify for disability benefits in Hawaii, the following conditions must be met: (a) the injury or illness must not be work-related; (b) the injury or illness must prevent the applicant from performing her regular job duties; and (c) the applicant must be under the care of a licensed physician who certifies her disability. HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-26 (2009 The maximum benefit amount that may be paid for each period of disability is one-third (1/3) of the total wages the claimant earned in New Jersey covered employment during the base year, or twenty-six times the weekly benefit amount, whichever is less. The first seven days of disability are called the waiting week, meaning benefits are payable on the eighth consecutive day of disability. 190 Finally, Rhode Island's disability insurance 191 provides a weekly benefit rate that is equal to not more than 85% of the wages paid to the employee in the highest earning quarter of her base period.
192 As of July 1, 2009, the minimum weekly benefit rate is $69.00 and $694.00 is the maximum benefit rate. 193 The maximum benefit period is thirty weeks. 194 Generally, a worker must have been paid at least $8,880.00 in either their base period or an alternate base period in order to qualify for benefits. 195 In addition, an applicant must serve a one-week waiting period.
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B. Blueprint for New State Mandated Disability Plans: An Ideal Solution
As illuminated in the previous Part, there is a wide variety among the existing state-mandated disability insurance schemes ranging from funding to benefits. Thus, this Part offers a blueprint of the best design elements from the existing plans as a guide for states implementing state-mandated disability insurance in the future. As a starting point, state-mandated disability insurance should accomplish three goals: (1) provide coverage with reasonable eligibility requirements so that all workers will be protected against disability losses; (2) provide adequate benefits so that that the disabled worker will be able to pay for basic necessities; and (3) distribute the cost of insurance in a fair and efficient manner.
196 State-mandated disability insurance is preferable to a concerted effort to incentivize more private employers to offer disability insurance because it ensures that all workers will be covered, and because it eliminates the adverse selection problem. 
Coverage
In contrast to many of the existing disability models, any state considering adopting a disability insurance scheme should extend eligibility to cover all workers. 198 All workers are at risk of a disability-induced bankruptcy and should receive protection from wage interruption as a result of a disability. Therefore, it follows that the definition of disability should be sufficiently broad to cover almost all instances of disabilities resulting from a non-work-related injury or illness. Disability should be defined as the inability to perform the regular duties of employment at her most recent job due 197. See supra note 102 (discussing adverse selection as a reason why insurers have not made a marketing push for disability insurance). State-mandated disability insurance also significantly increases moral hazard if the benefit levels are set to provide only for basic necessities and are limited in duration.
198. California's program does not cover railroad workers, non-profit agency employees, and some government employees. CAL. UNEMP. to a physical or mental disability or illness. 199 In addition, the waiting period for benefits should be no more than a week.
Funding
Although some states use only employee-funded payroll taxes, 200 it is preferable for employers to shoulder the burden, in addition to the employees, for a number of reasons. First, employer contributions provide an additional revenue stream. With the high unemployment rate, states that rely solely on employee contributions are particularly vulnerable to revenue shortfalls. For example, with California's unemployment rate hovering around 12%, 201 some have estimated that unless California raises the rates that employees pay into the disability fund, the system could soon go bankrupt. 202 Second, employers derive a benefit from state-mandated disability insurance. Having wage replacement reduces the stress that is often associated with a disability. Less stress speeds up recovery time, which will reduce absenteeism and benefit the employer's bottom line. Third, the employer receives some reciprocal benefits associated with the employee's ability to maintain some level of consumption while avoiding bankruptcy. Employees, who are provided with wage replacement through disability insurance, retain their ability to buy essential goods and continue to consume. Because consumption drives the economy, enabling families to have adequate resources to consume basic necessities is a positive benefit for everyone.
Although it is equitable to ask employers and employees to contribute, the tax rate should not be unduly burdensome.
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Therefore, the ideal rate of tax is probably 0.5% of wages for both the employee and the employer. Currently, all the states cap the amount of income that is subject to the disability insurance payroll deduction. Low income caps jeopardize continued viability of the plans and prevent some state's plans, like New York, 203 from providing sufficient wage replacement. Thus, the 0.5% payroll deduction, like the Medicare tax, should not be subject to a contribution limit or cap. 204 
Plan administration
The states mandating disability insurance organize the administration of the plans in one of two ways. First, some states have created a state fund with the payroll contributions and pay all benefits out of the state fund. 205 Other states have implemented a "play-or-pay" strategy. Under this approach, the states create a fund and allow employers to opt out of the state fund in order to selfinsure or purchase a private plan. 206 Eliminating private insurers and relying exclusively on the state to administer the plan ultimately is the best option for two important reasons.
First, state administration allows the state greater control in ensuring that claims are processed properly. 207 Although some will argue that state administration leads to waste and is inefficient, reports of abuse are still more easily correctable if the state maintains control. For instance, California's temporary disability insurance plan has received negative press for improperly processing claims, which State-Mandated Disability Insurance 1369 contributed to millions in losses for the plan. 208 The same report found that the percentage of paperwork mistakes made by state employees was 39% in 2001 and 27.5% in 2002. 209 Further, utilization of a private insurer does not ensure that claims will be properly administered. Unum, the largest disability insurer in the country, was fined $8 million and ordered to reassess over 26,000 cases of disability that were denied in bad faith. 210 The state has a vested interest in ensuring that its citizens are treated fairly and receive disability benefits. Therefore, the state should undertake administration of claims and periodic reviews of its efficiency.
Second, the mandate to buy private health insurance has been a point of contention with the PPACA even with the existence of precedent for Congress and state legislatures to channel the spending of private resources toward certain public objectives such as COBRA, 211 and provides certain former employees, retirees, spouses, former spouses, and dependent children the right to temporary continuation of health coverage at group rates. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(i) (2006) . This coverage, however, is only available when coverage is lost due to certain specific qualifying events. Id. Group health coverage for COBRA participants is usually more expensive than health coverage for active employees, since usually the employer pays a part of the premium for active employees while COBRA participants generally pay the entire premium themselves. Id.
212. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) more directly prohibits employers from imposing rules of employee plan eligibility that restrict access based on, inter alia, health status, medical condition, prior claims experience, or even a preexisting condition. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a)(1)).
213. The Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 ("WHCRA") applies to persons covered under group and individual health plans, and it requires these insurers to cover breast reconstruction in connection with mastectomies. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185b(a) (West 2011). Thus, to the extent that a health plan covers mastectomies, the reconstruction of the affected breast, surgery and reconstruction of the other breast (for symmetry purposes), prostheses, and treatment for possible mastectomy complications must also be covered. Id.
214. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act that protects women was passed in 1978 and BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 1370 to believe that a similar mandate in the disability context would not meet similar resistance. 215 Further, both California and Rhode Island have managed to administer their plans for over fifty years. 216 Thus, other states are likely capable of doing so as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
Medical bankruptcies are an unfortunate byproduct of the rising cost of health care and lost wages. Congress has focused on health care reform as a panacea for medical bankruptcies. Because a large percentage of debtors and homeowners on the brink of foreclosure and bankruptcy report that an illness and lost wages led to their financial troubles, it is prudent to expand the safety nets available to individuals in this predicament. Recent proposals to expand health insurance coverage will not prevent families from suffering a financial collapse in the wake of a medical crisis.
Disability insurance provides wage replacement to workers who have a non-job related illness or injury. However, many workers do not have affordable access to this type of insurance. Expanding statemandated short-term disability programs is a necessary component of any attempt to solve the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. States that have mandated disability insurance for workers on average have lower per capita bankruptcy rates. Thus, the data suggests that mandating disability insurance for employees is an effective remedy to the medical bankruptcy imbroglio.
mandates that any health insurance provided by an employer must cover expenses for pregnancy-related conditions on the same basis as costs for other medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
215. See supra note 133 (discussing the litigation that has grown out of the enactment of the PPACA).
216. The costs associated with administering disability insurance programs are not tremendous. 
